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Public Wrongs and the ‘Criminal Law’s
Business’: When Victims Won’t Share
Michelle Madden Dempsey*

Amongst the many valuable contributions that Professor Antony Duff has made to
criminal law theory is his account of what it means for a wrong to be public in
character. Given that much of his writing on this topic has been developed over a
series of articles with frequent co-author Professor Sandra Marshall, I shall refer to it
as the Duff-Marshall account of public wrongs (Marshall and Duff 1998; 2009;
Duff and Marshall 2010). In this chapter, I sketch an alternative way of thinking
about criminalization, one which attempts to remain true to the important insights
that illuminate the Duff-Marshall account, while providing (it is hoped) a more
satisfying explanation of cases involving victims who reject the criminal law’s
intervention.
According to the Duff-Marshall account, the scope of public wrongs is not
limited to those which directly victimize the public collectively (such as terrorist
attacks), but also includes wrongs which are directed primarily at individual victims
(such as murder, rape, assault, etc.). The puzzle that Duff and Marshall have so
fruitfully addressed is how to make sense of the idea that a wrong against an
individual victim is also, at the same time, public in character.1 In brief, their
view is that wrongs done to individual victims can be shared by a polity, thereby
becoming public wrongs:
A group can . . . ‘share’ the wrongs done to its individual members, insofar as it deﬁnes and
identiﬁes itself as a community united by mutual concern, by genuinely shared . . . values
and interests, and by the shared recognition that its members’ goods (and their identity) are

*
My thanks to Andrew Ashworth, Kimberley Brownlee and Matthew Kramer for their comments
on a previous draft of this chapter.
1
Duff does not deny that wrongs to individual victims may also properly be pursued by the
individual victims as private wrongs (e.g. torts) and that the polity can and should support the victim in
so responding (e.g. by providing a civil cause of action, access to courts, enforcing judgments for
damages arising from a private cause of action, etc.). Rather, the puzzle Duff and Marshall address is
under what conditions it is justiﬁable for the polity itself to respond directly to the wrong, rather than
merely responding indirectly by supporting the victim’s direct response. On direct and indirect
responses to wrongdoing, see Dempsey 2009a, ch. 9. See also Green 2009 and Marshall and Duff
2009.
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bound up with their membership of the community. Wrongs done to individual members
of the community are then wrongs against the whole community . . . insofar as the individual
goods which are attacked are goods in terms of which the community identiﬁes and
understands itself. (Marshall and Duff 1998: 20)

The Duff-Marshall account of public wrongs is a matter of foundational importance to Duff ’s criminal law theory more generally, since it delineates what he takes
to be the proper scope of the ‘criminal law’s business’. This phrase, borrowed from
the Wolfenden Committee Report, is often quoted by Duff when discussing what
he takes to be the proper limits of the criminal law. Indeed, it appears in nearly
every account Duff offers regarding ‘public wrongs’ (Duff 2005: 441; 2008: 107;
2010b: 138; 2010c: 589, 595–7; Duff and Marshall 2010: 71). It remains unclear,
however, whether the notion of the ‘criminal law’s business’ does much work in
unpacking the Duff-Marshall account of public wrongs, since the logical relationship between what counts as a ‘public wrong’ and what counts as the ‘criminal law’s
business’ is more circular than explanatory: some wrongs are private, not public;
private wrongs are not the criminal law’s business; wrongs that are not the criminal
law’s business do not properly concern the criminal law; wrongs that do not
properly concern the criminal law are private, not public; and so on . . . 2
Duff is frequently concerned to distance his ‘public wrongs’ approach from what
he labels ‘legal moralism’. According to Duff, legal moralism endorses ‘the claim
that moral wrongfulness is a good reason for criminalization’ (Duff 2007: 84). The
error in legal moralism, according to Duff, is ‘that it takes all wrongdoing, of any
and every kind, to be in principle the business of the criminal law’, rather than
limiting the scope of criminalization to public wrongdoing (Duff and Marshall
2010: 71, emphasis added). Legal moralism’s approach to criminalization risks
becoming ‘radically over-inclusive’, warns Duff, ‘since it implies that we have good
reason to criminalise every kind of moral wrongdoing, even if other considerations
often then tip the balance against criminalisation’ (Duff 2007: 47–8). In rejecting
legal moralism, Duff observes:
We surely have no reason, not even one outweighed by countervailing reasons, to criminalise such undoubted and serious wrongs as the betrayal of a friend’s conﬁdence, or the
demeaningly contemptuous dismissal of a colleague’s ideas. I am of course answerable for
such wrongs to those whose business they are – to my friends, or to my colleagues;
but . . . such wrongs are, ‘in brief and crude terms, not the law’s business’. (Duff 2007: 48)

Whilst I am sympathetic to Duff ’s tendency toward minimalism in criminalization,
I worry that his critique of legal moralism moves too quickly and thereby risks
obscuring a more plausible third way of delineating the proper scope of criminal
law. In what follows, I will highlight some problems with Duff ’s critique of legal
moralism, suggest an alternative method for approaching questions regarding the
proper scope of criminalization, and put this method to work in addressing a type
of case that has caused the Duff-Marshall account of public wrongs particular

2

See Duff 2010a.
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difﬁculty: that is, cases in which victims refuse to share their wrongs with the
community.

1. Duff ’s Critique of Legal Moralism
Duff ’s critique of legal moralism moves too quickly on two fronts. First, it fails to
distinguish between having a reason to do something and having a good reason to
do it. In some sense, of course, every reason is a good reason (for a bad reason is, we
might say, no reason at all)—but the sense in which Duff uses the phrase ‘good
reason’ suggests that he means to refer to a particularly weighty or strong ﬁrst-order
reason, or perhaps even a second-order reason.3 If, however, the claim of legal
moralism is simply that we have a reason to criminalize any wrong—and perhaps
that reason is nothing more than a 98lb weakling of a reason which is easily defeated
by stronger or weightier reasons against criminalization—then the risk of radical
over-inclusiveness that worries Duff seems to fade considerably. Indeed, there is
little reason to think that the legal moralism Duff takes as his foil would lead to a
substantially broader scope to the criminal law than Duff would be willing to
endorse—for the mere fact that there exists a reason (even a good one, whatever
that might mean) to criminalize a wrong does not entail that criminalization would
be justiﬁed all-things-considered (Moore 1997: 68–75, 739–95).
In this regard, it is worth noting the shift in phrasing that Duff occasionally
makes when arguing his case against legal moralism. Oftentimes, he subtly moves
from making claims about what we do or do not have reason to criminalize to
making claims about what we should ‘say’ we have reason or not to criminalize
(Duff and Marshall 2010: 73, 75–6). Tellingly, Duff has even framed the argument
in terms of what members of a legislature should think about their reasons for
criminalizing something (Duff 2007: 47). This shift is noteworthy because it
suggests that there may be a tension in Duff ’s work between what is intended to
be illuminating for fellow philosophers and what is intended to be chilling for
prospective legislators (and, presumably, other criminal justice actors). My concern
here is that the latter project may negatively impact the former, for whilst it may be
appropriate to limit the range of considerations legislators take into account with
rules of thumb regarding the proper scope of their deliberations when legislating,
we should not allow those rules of thumb to obscure a full philosophical account of
the reasons that actually do bear on the justiﬁability of their conduct.4 Put another
way, it is possible that both of the following may be the case: (1) it is true we
have good reason to criminalize any and all wrongdoing and (2) legislators
should not bear that truth in mind when acting qua legislators.5 Professor Duff ’s

3
On the distinction between ﬁrst- and second-order reasons and the variety of second-order
reasons, see Raz 1990: 39–40 and postscript; Raz 1979: 18, 21–3.
4
On rules of thumb, see Schauer 1991: 104–11.
5
Compare Gardner 2007: 211.
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equivocation between what we actually do have reason to criminalize and what we
(or legislators) should think we have reason to criminalize obscures this possibility.
A second way in which Professor Duff ’s critique of legal moralism moves too
quickly is in its failure to distinguish one’s having a reason to ç and ç-ing being
one’s business—for one may have a reason to ç without ç-ing being one’s business.6
For example, you may encounter a particularly glum-looking stranger walking
down the street. If he would be cheered by your warm smile, then normally you
will have a reason to smile at him.7 (Of course, the fact that you have a reason to
smile at the stranger is not yet to say that you should smile at him all-thingsconsidered. He may be glum and creepy as well, such that any reasons you have to
smile at him are defeated by the reasons you have to refrain from smiling at creepy
strangers.8) Absent unusual circumstances, however, your ability to cheer him gives
you at least a reason to do so.9 Yet, the mere fact that you have a reason to smile at
him does not make it your business to do so. If you are his friend or family member,
then cheering him may fall within the ambit of your business—but absent your
standing in a special role vis-à-vis the glum man, cheering him is simply none of
your business.10
How then can we make progress in identifying the things that fall within the
ambit of our business? Continuing with the example of cheering someone, we can
provide at least a partial explanation of why bringing cheer is properly thought to be
the business of friends and family rather than random strangers by reference to the
fact that friends and family are typically in a particularly good position to realize the
value of cheering one another, whilst strangers are not. This idea of ‘being in a
particularly good position to realize a value’ can be at least partially cashed out in
terms of epistemic and efﬁciency considerations.11 First, in virtue of our roles and
relationships within the social forms of friendship and family, we typically stand
Conversely ç-ing may be one’s business without one having any reason to ç. See n. 10.
To elaborate, your reason to smile is grounded in the fact that you can realize the value of
bringing cheer to the glum stranger. This account is consistent with what I have previously referred to
as the normal correspondence thesis: that, in the normal course of things, the fact that one’s doing a
particular action can realize value provides a reason for one to perform that action (Dempsey 2009a:
58, 86–90). See also Gardner and Macklem 2002. Neither Gardner and Macklem 2002 nor Dempsey
2009a makes the distinction I draw here between one having a reason to ç and ç-ing being one’s
business.
8
Just as the ability to realize value through an action generates a reason to perform that action, so
too does the ability to realize disvalue through an action generate a reason to refrain from performing
that action. If smiling at a creepy stranger would generate disvalue by, for example, jeopardizing your
safety, that disvalue generates a reason not to smile.
9
On the matter of unusual circumstances disrupting the normal correspondence between reason
and value, see Dempsey 2009a: 86–91.
10
Conversely, there are times when doing something is your business, but you have no reason to do
it. For example, it is the business of parents to try to cheer their glum teens, but as many a frustrated
parent has experienced, sometimes trying to cheer a glum teen is destined to fail or even backﬁre,
making the teen not only glum but angry as well. In that case, trying to cheer the teen is still the
parent’s business, but she has no reason to try. For an illuminating discussion of the relationship
between reasons to try and reasons to succeed, see Gardner 2004.
11
Gardner has cashed out the idea of being ‘particularly well-placed’ in terms of his ‘efﬁciency
principle’, which is principally concerned with ‘the efﬁcient use of rational energy’ (Gardner 2007:
278).
6
7
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in a position of epistemic privilege vis-à-vis our friends and family, which explains
(in part) why certain matters properly fall within the ambit of our business as
friends and family. Friends and family, that is, are more likely to know and
understand what has caused the person to become glum, what is most likely to
bring him cheer, when attempts to cheer him are likely to backﬁre, and so forth.
Second, in virtue of the fact that friends and family typically have more frequent
interactions with one another than strangers do, the ability to realize the value of
cheering a friend or family member typically has relatively few transaction costs.
These low costs ground further considerations of efﬁciency that explain (in part)
why cheering someone is properly considered to be the business of friends and
family rather than strangers.12
If this distinction between having a reason to ç and ç-ing being one’s business is
plausible, then it opens up space to consider a third way to approach the question of
what kinds of wrongs fall within the ambit of the ‘criminal law’s business’. I will
develop this alternate account in section 3 below. First, however, I will examine
some methodological points of departure that illustrate how Professor Duff ’s
approach to these questions differs from my own.

2. Justifying Criminalization: On Starting Points
It is relatively uncontroversial to observe that criminalization calls for justiﬁcation.
When legislators create criminal prohibitions, when police and prosecutors arrest
suspects and pursue charges against them, when juries or judges convict defendants,
when judges impose sentences upon the convicted, and when jailors and their ilk
effect punishment in executing those sentences—each of these criminal justice
ofﬁcials stands in need of justiﬁcation for their conduct.13 In order to make
progress on the question of whether such actions are justiﬁed, it is necessary to
consider the reasons these ofﬁcials have for engaging in these acts. What kinds of
reasons, we may ask, can do the normative work required to justify the conduct of
criminal justice ofﬁcials?
That, in any event, is how I tend to go about contemplating such matters—and
in section 3 below I will use this approach to begin developing an account of what
falls within the ambit of the criminal law’s business. First, however, it is worth

12
Indeed, the extremely low transaction costs borne by the stranger walking toward the glum man
on the street might support the claim that smiling at him is the stranger’s business, such that we might
justiﬁably criticize the stranger who fails to offer a warm smile by remarking, ‘Why didn’t you just
smile? What would it have cost you?’
13
I will use the label ‘criminal justice ofﬁcials’ to refer to those typically so-named (such as police,
prosecutors, judges, and jailors/probation ofﬁcers)—as well as to refer to actors within the criminal
justice system who play an ofﬁcial role within the system, albeit on a more temporary basis (for
example, jurors)—and ﬁnally to those who do not act within the criminal justice system itself, but
instead posit the laws that structure and guide the system (for example, legislators). My claim above is
that all of these actors stand in need of justiﬁcation for their contributions to the overall project of
criminalization.
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noting that Professor Duff offers a somewhat different way of approaching such
questions. As he explains:
A justiﬁcation of criminalisation will need to begin by specifying some value(s) that can be
claimed to be public, as part of the polity’s self-deﬁnition; show how the conduct in
question violates that value or threatens the goods that it protects; and argue that the
violation or threat is such as to require or demand a public condemnation. (Duff 2007: 143)

My approach to thinking about the justiﬁcation of criminalization differs from Duff ’s
in several respects. One minor distinction that should not distract us long is that Duff
approaches the justiﬁcation of criminalization as if it were an inquiry into the
conditions under which criminalization is ‘required’ or ‘demanded’, while I approach
the issue as an inquiry into the conditions under which criminalization is justiﬁed (in
the sense of being permissible14) and, if so, to what extent criminalization constitutes
an effective use of state power (Dempsey 2009a, ch. 8). Given the tremendous costs of
the criminal justice system (both economic and moral) and the historic and ongoing
injustices perpetrated in the name of the criminal justice system, it seems to me that it
is quite difﬁcult enough to identify the conditions under which criminalization is
permissible and effective, much less ‘required’ or ‘demanded’ all-things-considered.
More importantly, my approach differs from Duff ’s insofar as I frame my account
of the justiﬁcation of criminalization in terms of the reasons that apply to actors
operating within distinct roles within the criminal justice system, rather than framing
it in terms of the values that are violated or threatened by defendants through their
criminal conduct. My focus on the reasons that apply to the conduct of criminal
justice ofﬁcials, however, is not unrelated to questions of value; for on my account, the
fact that a criminal justice ofﬁcial can realize a value by ç-ing normally generates a
reason for her to ç.15 So, for example, the fact that a police ofﬁcer can realize a value by
arresting an offender, or a prosecutor can realize a value by prosecuting him, generates
reason for them to do so (Dempsey 2009a, chs 4–5; 2009b).
On a related point, while Duff focuses on values that are violated or threatened
by the criminal conduct of offenders, I focus on values that can be realized by the
conduct of criminal justice actors. Oftentimes, of course, these values are two sides of
the same coin: the values violated or threatened by offenders’ conduct (for example,
the value of public safety or bodily integrity) will often be the same values that can
be realized by the criminal justice ofﬁcial’s conduct (for example, insofar as an arrest
or prosecution enhances or maintains public safety or protects individuals’ bodily
integrity). Sometimes, however, the values that are violated or threatened by
offenders’ conduct will not be realized by criminal justice ofﬁcials’ actions. The
value of a victim’s sense of self-determination may be violated or threatened in a
violent assault, for example, yet this value may very well not be realized through the
14
The notion of permissibility I wish to invoke is that of ‘weak permissibility’. On the distinction
between weak permissibility and strong permissibility, see Kramer 2004: 280–3.
15
In other words, on my account ‘reasons for action track value’ (Raz 2001: 1). For elaboration, see
Dempsey 2009a, chs 5, 9. My account is broadly consistent with Gardner and Macklem 2002 and
with the general correspondence between reason and value that underpins Raz’s early work (Raz 1990:
24–5).
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conduct of criminal justice ofﬁcials if, say, they pursue charges against her wishes
(Dempsey 2009a, ch. 9). Under such circumstances, whilst the violation or threat
to the value of the victim’s sense of self-determination can explain (in part) why an
offender’s conduct was wrongful, that value does not generate a reason in favour of
prosecuting the offender (for, ex hypothesi, the prosecution does not realize that
value). Finally, some values that can be realized through criminal justice ofﬁcials’
actions (and thus are relevant to justifying criminalization on my account) are not
values that are violated or threatened by the offender’s conduct. For example, it
makes little sense to think of the value of retribution as being violated or threatened
by an offender’s conduct, yet if we grant that retribution is a genuine value, then
surely the value of retribution can be relevant to justifying the conduct of at least
some criminal justice ofﬁcials (such as jailors); for insofar as the value of retribution
generates a reason for action weighing in favour of their conduct (for example, the
jailor’s locking of the prison gate), that value is relevant to justifying their conduct.
Another key distinction between my starting point and Professor Duff ’s is that
while he limits the universe of values that can be relevant to justifying criminalization to those ‘that can be claimed to be public, as part of the polity’s self-deﬁnition’,
I would impose no such limitation. As I understand it, this limitation precludes
consideration of wholly individualistic values (ones that no one claims to be public
and that play no role in the polity’s self-deﬁnition) from doing any normative work
when it comes to justifying criminalization. On my account, in contrast, such
individualistic values can, at least in principle, generate reasons that are relevant to
justifying the actions of criminal justice ofﬁcials. Consider a prosecution for
domestic violence involving closeted same-sex romantic partners in which the
victim requests dismissal in hopes of avoiding the ‘outing’ that would occur if the
details of the relationship were divulged at trial. The value to the victim of
remaining in the closet is hardly a value that is ‘claimed to be public’, nor is it in
any way ‘part of the polity’s self-deﬁnition’—yet, it seems plausible to suppose that
such individualist values can nonetheless ground reasons in favour of the prosecutor
dismissing the case at the victim’s request.16

3. The Institutional Bureaucracy Account
In this section, I offer a different approach to thinking about the justiﬁcation of
criminalization, which I will refer to as the institutional-bureaucracy account.
Inspired by Duff ’s approach, I will attempt to tether this account closely to the
question of what is properly within the ambit of ‘the criminal law’s business.’ In
16
Framing the example in terms of prosecution rather than the legislative decision to enact a
prohibition against same-sex domestic violence does not switch the focus from criminalization to
prosecution, for on the Duff-Marshall account of public wrongs, the two are inextricably related. As
they have noted, ‘the process of prosecution is crucial to the idea of crime’ and ‘[o]ne who commits a
public wrong is properly called to public account for it and the criminal trial constitutes (in ideal
theory, if all too obviously not in actual practice) such a public calling to account’ (Duff and Marshall
2010: 72). See also n. 33 below.
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doing so, I hope to provide a plausible alternative to both the Duff-Marshall
account (according to which the criminal law’s business is limited to public
wrongdoing); and the legal moralist account (according to which the criminal
law’s business includes any and all wrongdoing).
According to the institutional-bureaucracy account, the best way to approach the
task of explaining the universe of reasons that apply to any given actor operating
within an institutional bureaucracy (such as the criminal justice system) is to begin
by identifying the kinds of actions she can perform given her role within the
bureaucracy, whom she represents when acting in that role, and the kinds of values
she can realize in performing those actions in that role. Once this array of axiological reasons is in view, we can entertain debates as to whether doing one’s duty
generates additional ﬁrst-order reasons that are not already accounted for in virtue
of the value of doing so (Herman 1981, Baron 1984) and further consider the
impact that duties may have insofar as they generate exclusionary or self-reﬂexive
second-order reasons that bear normative force on a person’s rational horizons (Raz
1990: 39–40, 178–99). Proceeding in this way, the institutional-bureaucracy
account aims to consider all of the reasons that apply to each actor, and to evaluate
her justiﬁcation in light of these reasons (i.e. ‘all-things-considered’): if she acts for
an undefeated reason, all-things-considered, then her conduct is justiﬁed.17
Applying this methodology to evaluating the justiﬁcation of actions by criminal
justice ofﬁcials, it is important to recognize at the outset that criminal justice
ofﬁcials—in virtue of their distinct roles within criminal justice systems—can
perform actions that are unique to those roles. Legislators can create criminal
prohibitions, while others cannot;18 police can arrest, while others cannot;19
prosecutors can prosecute, while others cannot, and so forth.20 In some ways,
then, the fact that criminal justice ofﬁcials operate within the institutional bureaucracies of criminal justice systems expands the universe of reasons that apply to
them (and are thus, we are assuming at present, are relevant to justifying their
conduct). The fact that criminal justice ofﬁcials can perform actions with respect to
which non-ofﬁcials are impotent—and the fact that those actions can realize value
and/or disvalue—means that ofﬁcials can have reasons for action that non-ofﬁcials
do not.21 Prosecutors, for example, can have reasons to pursue (or discontinue)
prosecutions, while non-prosecutors can have no such reasons because non-prose17
This aspect of the account borrows from John Gardner’s work on justiﬁcation and reasons
(Gardner 1996). I will not here attend to the distinction Gardner draws between what is justiﬁable and
what is justiﬁed. For further discussion, see Dempsey 2009a: ch. 5. More generally, the institutionalbureaucracy account is inﬂuenced by themes developed in Gardner’s work on criminalization,
especially Gardner 1998; 2007: 276–83. I will not explore the differences in our accounts here.
18
Judges can, although less commonly do, create criminal prohibitions as well. (For example, R v. R
[1992] 1 AC 599 created a prohibition against marital rape previously unknown to English law).
19
The obvious exception here being the historic and mostly discontinued process of citizen’s arrest.
20
Again, the exception being the largely discontinued practice of private prosecutions. In the UK,
the Crown Prosecution Service must approve the private prosecution and can take over or discontinue
the prosecution, thus raising serious doubts as to the sense, if any, in which these are genuinely private
prosecutions.
21
Compare Gardner 2007: 202.
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cutors are simply not institutionally situated either to pursue or discontinue
prosecutions (Dempsey 2009a: ch. 3).
The next step is to identify whom the criminal justice ofﬁcial represents when
she acts in her particular role.22 By acting qua legislator, police ofﬁcer, prosecutor,
judge, jury or jailor, individuals act not only on their own behalf, but also as
representatives of distinct groups. Most obviously, criminal justice ofﬁcials act as
representatives of the polity or sovereign in whose name they act (e.g. ‘the People’,
‘’Regina’) (Duff 2005: 459–60); (Dempsey 2009a: 48–50). Moreover, insofar as
their actions are performed in a context which meets a certain threshold of political
legitimacy, the criminal justice ofﬁcials can be understood to be acting as representatives of their communities.23 Importantly, however, in acting qua criminal
justice ofﬁcials, these people do not directly represent victims (Dempsey 2009a:
ch. 9; Harel 2008). We shall return to that last point below.
Identifying the group whom an institutional actor represents while acting within
a particular bureaucratic role is relevant to the third step in our analysis: identifying
the kinds of values she can realize in performing those actions in that role. Consider
the different kinds of values that people can realize when responding to wrongdoing
and the way that these values are sensitive to the fact of whom the people represent
when acting: Alex pushes Blair—Blair tells Alex off (‘You violent jerk!’) and then
walks away—Blair walks past Chris, who smiles encouragingly as Blair passes—
Alex then lunges for Blair again—Chris restrains Alex and calls Alex to account
(‘What the heck are you doing?!’). In this hypothetical, Blair and Chris realize
different sorts of values in responding to Alex’s wrongdoing. Blair realizes values of
standing-up for oneself and self-preservation, whilst Chris (at ﬁrst) realizes the value
of supportive fellow-feeling toward Blair and (later) realizes the value of calling a
wrongdoer to account and protecting another human being from harm.24 As Chris
is not Alex’s victim, Chris cannot realize the same kinds of values that Blair can
realize in responding to Alex’s wrongdoing. Likewise, as Blair is Alex’s victim, Blair
cannot realize the same kinds of values that Chris can realize in responding to Alex’s
wrongdoing. Rather, each person, in virtue of their role as victim or bystander, has
distinct capacities to realize distinct values.
It is worth pausing to note how different the institutional-bureaucracy account is
from the Duff-Marshall account of public wrongs. On the Duff-Marshall account,
communities share the wrongs done to individual victims, such that the ‘wrongs
22
This is where my account starts to differ from Gardner’s and takes on (what some may call)
a more ‘agent-relative’ ﬂavour. Whilst I endorse Gardner’s articulation of the agent-neutralist view that
‘wrongdoing by anyone is fundamentally everyone’s concern,’ I do not believe (as he seems to) that this
fact entails that ‘[w]e all have one and the same reason . . . to avoid the commission of any wrong.’
Insofar as people are differently positioned to realize that value, people will have different reasons vis-àvis that value. Moreover, insofar as some people cannot realize that value, they will have no reason to do
so. I take this view to be more consistent with Gardner’s work regarding the relationship between
reason and value, especially Gardner 2004.
23
See Dempsey 2009a: 49–52, discussing Duff et al. 2007: 138. We can take this thought further
by distinguishing the sense in which legislators represent the electorate, or jurors represent the
defendant’s peers, whilst police and prosecutor more clearly represent the polity or sovereign.
24
For further discussion, see Dempsey 2009a, ch. 9.
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done to individual members of the community are then wrongs against the whole
community’ (Marshall and Duff 1998: 20). The institutional-bureaucracy account
strongly resists this move, preferring instead to identify the distinct values that each
individual can realize in responding to wrongdoing in his or her own capacity—as a
victim or a bystander. On my account, communities are best understood as
bystanders, capable of engaging in coordinated action, who happen to be wellpositioned to realize distinct values in responding to wrongdoing against one of
their number.25 Victims and their communities are able to realize distinct values in
responding to wrongdoing: victims have their own values to realize, and communities have their own values to realize. Put in terms of reasons for action: victims
have their reasons, and communities have their own. If we think of wrongs as being
shared as the Duff-Marshall account claims, we obscure this distinction between
the reasons that apply to individual victims and the reasons that apply to their
communities—thereby obscuring some of the reasons that may justify a community’s response to wrongdoing.

4. The Criminal Law’s Business
Let us return now to the question set out in the ﬁrst paragraph of section 2 above:
‘what kinds of reasons, if any, can do the normative work required to justify the
conduct of criminal justice ofﬁcials?’ According to the framework elaborated so
far—which I have referred to as the institutional-bureaucracy account—any adequate response to that question must attend to the particular roles that ofﬁcials hold
within the institutional bureaucracy, the actions that those roles make possible in
virtue of the bureaucratic division of labour within the institutions, the identity of
those represented by those ofﬁcial (e.g. the People, Regina, etc.), and the kinds
of values that ofﬁcials can realize through performing actions in those roles. In light
of the fact that each step in the process of criminalization involves distinct actions
taken by ofﬁcials in distinct roles, who are capable of realizing distinct values (and
disvalues), it makes little sense to ask generally about ‘the justiﬁcation of criminalization’—for, while the phrase may serve as a helpful short-hand when vague
generalities are called for, it does little to illuminate the various considerations
that might go into answering the question, as it covers over far too many salient
distinctions.26
Notably, unlike the Duff-Marshall account, the institutional-bureaucracy account
does not give any particular priority to parsing out which kinds of wrongdoing are
the proper targets of criminalization. Rather, it is principally concerned with questions regarding the justiﬁcation of criminalization that arise in virtue of the fact that

25
My account is therefore more consistent with the de facto model of community sketched
(without much savour) in Dworkin 1986: 209, as opposed to the rich sense of community that
informs Duff ’s work (Duff 2001: 42–6).
26
Compare Marshall and Duff 2009: 233.
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the criminal justice system—as a legal system—is an institutional bureaucracy.
It takes seriously the insight that ‘law is a system of reasons recognized and enforced
by law-applying institutions’ (Raz 1980: 212, emphasis added). With this understanding in view, the account attempts to identify how the institutional framework
of the criminal justice system affects the reasons that are relevant to its own
justiﬁcation.
As such, of course, the institutional-bureaucracy account provides nothing near
to a complete account of how to evaluate the justiﬁcation of criminalization. To
further ﬂesh out such an account, we would need to answer the question on which
the institutional-bureaucracy account is silent: which values are properly realized by
criminal justice ofﬁcials? Put another way, what is properly within the ambit of the
‘criminal law’s business’? Such a question directs our attention away from matters
in the philosophy of criminal law and more toward questions that arise in the realm
of political philosophy, such as the proper relationship between the individual and
community, how political institutions should be organized, what roles should be
created within the bureaucracies of these institutions, what powers should be
granted to those operating within those roles, and so forth.
The institutional-bureaucracy account does not provide fully ﬂeshed-out answers to these questions—nor does it suppose that the answers will be identical for
each type of legal or political system. It does, however, suggest a way forward in
thinking about how to address these questions—one which mirrors the discussion
above regarding the difference between ‘having a reason to ç’ and ‘ç-ing being one’s
business’. To review, the explanation of how the realization of particular values
becomes someone’s ‘business’ depends (in part) on whether the person typically
stands in a particularly good position to realize those values (and to avoid the
realization of disvalue). The two considerations we discussed above in considering
whether someone does stand in such a position vis-à-vis a particular value were
epistemic privilege and efﬁciency.27
Applying these considerations when delineating the scope of ‘the criminal law’s
business’, we may begin by asking what kinds of values criminal justice ofﬁcials are
particularly well-positioned to realize. John Gardner has identiﬁed one such value
in his discussion of the displacement function of the criminal justice system
(Gardner 1998): by taking the power to respond to wrongdoing out of the hands
of individual citizens (acting in their private capacities) and placing it in the hands
of a State-run institutional bureaucracy (where legal ofﬁcials act in their public
capacity), criminal justice ofﬁcials can realize the value of punishing wrongdoers,
without inviting the likely disvalue that would arise if victims and their family or
friends were left to take matters into their own hands. Thus, insofar as criminal
justice ofﬁcials are particularly well-positioned to realize the value of retribution
without realizing the disvalue of revenge, this consideration supports the argument

27
I don’t mean to suggest these considerations are a closed list, but they do strike me as two key
considerations in getting this analysis off the ground.
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that punishment for certain kinds of wrongs properly falls within the ambit of ‘the
criminal law’s business’.
None of this yet addresses, however, the question that so perplexes Duff and
Marshall: namely, which kinds of wrongs properly fall within the ambit of the
‘criminal law’s business’? Given the considerations above, one answer that now
seems evident is that the ‘criminal law’s business’ includes responding to wrongdoing that is likely to spark widespread revenge and social unrest. Duff and Marshall
might be willing to concede (with suitable qualiﬁcations) such obvious candidates
for criminalization—but what of the more difﬁcult cases—the kinds of wrongs
typically considered ‘private’? It is worth pausing to reﬂect on the various types of
conduct that have traditionally been deemed by liberal criminal law theorists to fall
within this notion of ‘private’. The Wolfenden Committee considered one type of
such conduct—homosexual sexual activity—in its report that coined the now
famous quip as to the scope of ‘the criminal law’s business’, and concluded that
this conduct was not properly a matter of concern for the criminal law.28 While the
committee’s conclusions on this point were correct, their mistake lay in thinking
that they were confronting a wrong which was to be assigned to either the private or
public sphere. Rather, the reason why homosexual sex does not properly fall within
the ambit of the ‘criminal law’s business’ is not that it is a private matter—but that
it is not wrong.29
Still, there remains a puzzling category of conduct which is concededly wrong—
and sometimes quite seriously so—but still does not properly fall within the ambit
of the criminal law’s business. One of Professor Duff ’s favourite examples of this
sort of conduct is the betrayal of a friend. He has as yet not ﬂeshed out this example
to explain what form the betrayal takes, but we can safely assume that that it is
something falling short of assault, theft, or some other conduct that might paradigmatically fall within the ambit of the ‘criminal law’s business’. Let us assume that
the betrayal takes the form of a sexual dalliance with the friend’s romantic partner: a
clear wrong—and a serious one at that—but not one which Duff (or I) would wish
to criminalize. How can we explain why this conduct does not fall within the ambit
of the criminal law’s business?
For Duff, the answer lies in the fact that this wrong is not the kind that can be
shared with the community: ‘the individual goods which are attacked are [not]
goods in terms of which the community identiﬁes and understands itself.’ But is
this a plausible explanation? First, it is rather a vague set of considerations—for just
what are the goods in terms of which a community identiﬁes and understands itself?
Moreover, in reﬂecting on those goods as they relate to the self-identity and selfunderstanding of a political community such as the US, it seems that the list of
relevant goods would prioritize goods such as economic security, entrepreneurialism,
28
Wolfenden Committee 1957. The Wolfenden Committee also considered prostitution, which
presents a rather more complicated picture. For some reﬂections, see Dempsey 2005; 2010.
29
To be more precise, homosexual sex, is not typically wrong all-things-considered. There can, of
course, be incidents of homosexual sex (for example, homosexual sexual assault or rape), which would
be wrong all-things-considered. My point here is that homosexual sex is no more wrong than
heterosexual sex (Dempsey and Herring 2007).
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and patriotism—which would suggest a rather odd way of delineating the proper
scope of the criminal law.30
Can the institutional-bureaucracy account do a better job of explaining why the
wrong of betraying a friend through a sexual dalliance with her romantic partner is,
whilst seriously wrongful, not within the ambit of the ‘criminal law’s business’? I
think so, based in part on considerations of epistemic privilege, efﬁciency, and the
criminal law’s displacement function. The argument runs as follows: In order to be
aware of the fact that the dalliance occurred and to understand enough of the
background facts regarding the relevant relationships so as to evaluate whether the
dalliance was wrong all-things-considered, one would have to stand in a highly
privileged epistemic position vis-à-vis the parties (who, typically, will have attempted to shield their dalliance from common knowledge, keeping it ‘private’ in
a descriptive sense (Gavison 1992)). Under normal circumstances, only the parties,
the victim, and their close friends and family will stand in this privileged epistemic
position, in virtue of the amount of time they spend together, the secrets they share,
and so forth. So, considerations of epistemic privilege suggest, preliminarily, that
such dalliances are not within the ambit of the ‘criminal law’s business.’
Now, it is of course possible that we could create a criminal justice system in
which criminal investigators are placed in people’s homes, attend parties and other
social events to catch all the gossip, tap every phone conversation, read every e-mail,
require people to disclose their deepest secrets, and so forth. If we had such a
system, then criminal justice ofﬁcials would indeed stand in a sufﬁciently privileged
epistemic position so as to conclude (prima facie) that the sexual dalliance falls
within the ambit of the criminal law. Yet there are at least two considerations that
weigh against an all-things-considered conclusion that this sort of wrong falls
within the ‘criminal law’s business’. First, creating such a criminal justice system
would be highly inefﬁcient in terms of the resources expended to secure the
necessary information relative to the value of calling the wrongdoer to account
and securing punishment. Second, if criminal justice ofﬁcials did stand in such an
intimate position vis-à-vis these issues, they perhaps might lose the sense of
detachment from the wrongdoing which is key to the criminal law’s displacement
function. The risk here is that the criminal justice ofﬁcial—through living closely
with and sharing the intimate details of people’s lives—might come to have the
same revenge-oriented response to wrongdoing that the victim and her close friends
and family would have, resulting in the criminal justice ofﬁcial acting as a ‘proxy
retaliator’ rather than serving the criminal law’s displacement function.31
Admittedly, the institutional-bureaucracy account provides only a partial explanation as to why such wrongs do not fall within the ambit of the ‘criminal law’s
business’; certainly many more considerations must be brought to bear in any
30

To be sure people in the US also recognize goods such as physical security, but it seems odd to
think of that good as one ‘in terms of which [the US] identiﬁes and understands itself ’.
31
Gardner 1998: 34. These considerations caution against community policing and stand strongly
against the mindset of some criminal justice ofﬁcials that they are ﬁghting with or on behalf of the
victims of crime. Compare Dubber 2002.
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complete and satisfying explanation of why this is so. One advantage this account
has over the Duff-Marshall account of public wrongs, however, is that it directs our
attention toward speciﬁc values (and disvalues) that can be realized by criminal
justice ofﬁcials depending on how the institutional bureaucracy of the criminal
justice system is organized and the range of actions made possible by the roles
created in that system. Once these values are in view, we can assess what shape
and form the institution should take and what roles are appropriate to it. The
institutional-bureaucracy account, while not complete on its own, is nonetheless
helpful insofar as it avoids the public/private dichotomy’s tendency to obscure
rather than to illuminate the very values upon which it is grounded (Dempsey
2009a: 31–41).

5. When Victims Won’t Share
If the arguments thus far hold, then the institutional-bureaucracy account can do
some work in delineating the ambit of the ‘criminal law’s business’ in terms of
considerations based on epistemic privilege, efﬁciency, and the criminal law’s
displacement function. But can this account further explain why certain matters
are and remain the ‘criminal law’s business’ even when they are not likely to cause
widespread revenge and unrest—when, for example, the wrong is one that is widely
tolerated in society and even the victim does not wish it to be pursued by the
criminal justice system?
We can make some progress in thinking about such cases if we begin by
recognizing that the displacement function is not the only value served by the
criminal justice system. Indeed, as Professor Duff has long observed, the criminal
justice system can serve important values of calling wrongdoers to account, making
their wrongdoing salient, and subjecting them to condemnatory punishment (Duff
2007: 87–9). Furthermore, as I have argued at length elsewhere, the criminal
justice system provides a context in which States and communities can realize the
value of reconstituting their characters in virtuous ways. (Dempsey 2007; 2009a:
chs 8–9)32 If we are correct, then these values—and the capacity of criminal justice
ofﬁcials to realize these values—might provide some clue as to why certain kinds of
wrongs (such as domestic violence and racist violence) are and remain within the
ambit of the ‘criminal law’s business’ even when those wrongs are widely tolerated
in society and even when the victims do not wish the wrongs to be pursued by the
criminal justice system. These wrongs become and remain the business of the
criminal law, we might say, in virtue of the ‘constitutive function’ of the criminal
law: the capacity of actions by criminal justice ofﬁcials to (re)constitute the
character of their States and communities in valuable ways (Dempsey 2007;
Dempsey 2009a).

32
Communities can, of course, use the criminal justice system to reconstitute their characters in
disvaluable ways as well (Dempsey 2009a: 51).
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The Duff-Marshall account has a difﬁcult time explaining why wrongs such as
domestic violence or racist violence fall within the ambit of the ‘criminal law’s
business’ even when the victim won’t share. After all, too often these wrongs are not
the kind which violate ‘genuinely shared . . . values and interests’ nor do they offend
‘goods in terms of which the community identiﬁes and understands itself ’ (Marshall and Duff 1998: 20). They are instead the kinds of wrongs that many people
(both historically and still today) have been content to leave alone, thinking that a
criminal justice response is unnecessary or inappropriate. Moreover, oftentimes
these wrongs are not, in actuality, shared by the individual victim with her
community. Rather, particularly in cases of domestic violence, many victims do
not want the criminal justice system to prosecute these wrongs.33 In such cases, the
Duff-Marshall metaphor of ‘sharing wrongs’ loses its appeal—while the spectre of
Christie’s account of the criminal justice system as ‘stealing’ the victim’s ‘conﬂict’
seems more apposite (Christie 1977).
In their most recent work on this topic, Duff and Marshall have attempted to
explain why these wrongs can still plausibly be thought of as public—as still being
shared by the community despite the victim’s refusal to share (Marshall and Duff
2010). In doing so, they distinguish two kinds of public wrongs: those which are
appropriate to criminalize at the level of general offence deﬁnition, but the
prosecution of which in any individual case may properly be left to the discretion
of the individual victim; and those which should be prosecuted even when the
victims genuinely want the case to be dismissed.34 Their explanation as to why it is
appropriate to go forward is grounded in the claim that these cases involve
wrongs that the victim ought to pursue – that it would be wrong to shrug off or ignore: she
might be disinclined to pursue it, but (we might say) that response is now wrong or
unreasonable.35

Moreover, they explain, these cases involve wrongs that ‘the polity must condemn if
it is to remain true to itself.’ According to the Duff-Marshall account then,
prosecuting against the victim’s wishes can be justiﬁed in virtue of ‘what the victim
owes not to himself, but to others, and on his responsibilities as a citizen’ (Marshall
and Duff 2010: 84). In such cases:

33
It is of course possible that the Duff-Marshall account is best understood as a thesis limited to the
question of criminalization through legislative action and simply does not extend well into the realm of
prosecutorial decision-making. If that is the case, then the institutional-bureaucracy account is best
understood as complementary rather than competitive to the Duff-Marshall account of public wrongs.
(Thanks to Andrew Ashworth for raising this point.) However, insofar as Duff and Marshall have
attempted to extend their account to answer questions regarding whether prosecutions should be
pursued without the victim’s support (Duff 2010a; Marshall and Duff 2010), the two accounts can be
understood as genuinely competitive alternatives.
34
To be precise, Duff and Marshall distinguish three types of public wrongs, the ﬁrst category of
which includes trivial public wrongs that do not merit a response from the criminal justice system
(Marshall and Duff 2010: 83).
35
Marshall and Duff 2010: 83. Writing separately on the same issue, Duff characterizes such
wrongs as ones which ‘it would be wrong for the victim to ignore’ (Duff 2010a: 23).
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[the victim] owes it to his fellow citizens . . . to pursue the wrongdoer: not, or not necessarily,
for the kinds of consequentialist reason to which some would appeal (the need to convict the
offender before he re-offends against others, for instance); but because not to pursue the
wrongdoer would be to betray the deﬁning values of the polity to which we all belong. (Marshall
and Duff 2010: 84, emphasis added)

As I suggested above, I believe the Duff-Marshall account of public wrongs has a
difﬁcult time explaining this category of cases. Their main difﬁculty lies in the fact
that very often when victims refuse to share their wrongs with their communities,
the victims are perfectly justiﬁed in their refusal. The domestic violence victim who
faces a much greater risk of being seriously injured or killed if she supports a
prosecution is not acting unjustiﬁably when she refuses or withdraws her support.
There is nothing ‘wrong or unreasonable’ about her choice. Moreover, crucially,
the justiﬁability of the continued prosecution is not dependent on the unreasonableness of the victim’s choice: she does not have to be wrong for us to be right. For,
as noted above, victims have their reasons for pursuing wrongs committed against
them and communities have their own distinct reasons for pursuing such wrongs.
By conﬂating these distinct sets of reasons under the cover of ‘sharing reasons’, the
Duff-Marshall account ﬁnds itself unable to explain the justiﬁability of so-called
‘victimless prosecutions’ without recourse to victim-blaming.
It is worth reﬂecting on the particular examples that Duff and Marshall consider
when discussing the category of cases which are appropriate to prosecute even
without victims’ support. In addition to murder (a wrong in which the individual
victim is no longer in a position to refuse to share), they tend to focus on wrongs
such as racist abuse, rape, and domestic violence. These exemplars are interesting
because the wrongness of each is (arguably) constituted in part by a particular
structural inequality that exists in the society in which they occur (Dempsey 2009a:
182, n. 73). They are, in other words, the kind of wrong that would not and could
not be committed but for the fact that the community in which they occur is
affected by a particular kind of character ﬂaw, such as being racist or patriarchal in
character (Dempsey 2009a: chs 6–7).
Duff ’s and Marshall’s use of these examples is particularly interesting because
these wrongs are not ones which ‘the polity must condemn if it is to remain true to
itself ’—rather, they are wrongs which the polity must condemn if it is to transform
itself (that is, reconstitute its character) in valuable ways. If the polity were merely
seeking to remain true to itself—to its ‘genuinely shared . . . values and interests’—it
would happily accept the victim’s refusal to share such wrongs, agreeing that
wrongs of that kind are best dealt with privately or not at all. A racist polity does
not condemn racist abuse through the criminal law in order to remain true to itself:
it does so (if it does so) to transform itself.36 Similarly, a patriarchal polity does not
condemn patriarchal violence in order to remain true to its ‘genuinely shared . . .
values and interests’, for, ex hypothesi, its ‘genuinely shared values’ include valuing
patriarchal social forms and its ‘genuinely shared interests’ include sustaining and
36

For interesting work on this theme, see Alﬁeri 1999; 2000; 2003.
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perpetuating the structural inequality of patriarchy. Rather, when a patriarchal
polity condemns patriarchal violence it reconstitutes itself as less patriarchal. In
order to realize this (re)constitutive value, the polity must act on its own behalf, for
its own reasons, and not merely on behalf of the victim (Dempsey 2009a, ch. 9).
To review, my argument regarding victims who refuse to share runs as follows.
Some communities (indeed, most communities of which I am aware) suffer (more
or less) from what we can think of as character ﬂaws grounded in structural
inequalities such as racism and patriarchy. These communities, we might say, are
racist or patriarchal in character. Moreover, the character of some kinds of wrongs
committed within these communities can be constituted, at least in part, by the
tendency these wrongs have to sustain or perpetuate these vicious character traits.
As I have argued elsewhere, for example, we can understand the wrong of domestic
violence as being partly constituted by its tendency to sustain or perpetuate the
structural inequality of patriarchy, thereby reinforcing the community’s patriarchal
character.37
Criminal justice ofﬁcials often stand in a particularly good position to act on
behalf of their communities so as to condemn the structural inequalities that
partially constitute wrongs such as domestic violence, racist violence, rape, gaybashing, etc.38 Moreover, if their condemnatory response to such structural inequalities is habituated, it has the potential to reconstitute the character of the
community as less patriarchal, less racist, less homophobic, and so forth (Dempsey
2009a, chs 8–9). It is (in part) because the criminal justice ofﬁcials act as representatives of their communities—rather than merely as representatives of the
individual victims—that they are particularly well-positioned to realize the value
of reconstituting the character of their communities in these valuable ways. They
are, in other words, often particularly well-suited to fulﬁlling the criminal law’s
constitutive function.39
Insofar as criminal justice ofﬁcials do fulﬁl the criminal law’s constitutive
function, we can begin to explain the justiﬁcation of criminal law’s intervention
in cases when Gardner’s displacement function does not apply. In other words,
criminal law’s intervention can be justiﬁed even in cases where people are not
inclined to retaliate against wrongdoers, indeed even in cases in which the victim
refuses to share the wrong done to her. For if the criminal law’s response to wrongs
37
Dempsey 2006; 2009a, chs 6–7. To be precise, my claim was that domestic violence in its strong
sense has this tendency—but this distinction need not distract us here. We can understand something
about the character of racist violence along similar lines (namely, that part of what constitutes the
wrong of racist violence is its tendency to sustain and perpetuate the racist character of the community
in which it occurs).
38
Of course, the fact that they stand in a good position to do so is no guarantee that they will do so.
My point here is simply to note that these legal ofﬁcial stand in the role of community representatives
who are charged with the responsibility of responding to wrongdoing within the community, including
wrongs that are partially constituted by structural inequalities.
39
Which is, again, not to say that they typically do fulﬁl this function. Nothing in my account is
inconsistent with observing that criminal justice ofﬁcials too often exacerbate the vicious character
traits at issue, making the State and community more patriarchal, racist, and so forth (Dempsey 2009a,
215–21).
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can realize the value of (re)constituting the character of the State and/or community
in valuable ways, then criminal intervention can be (partly) justiﬁed even when no
one desires retaliation and even when the victim refuses to share the wrong with her
community. Moreover, pace Duff, the victim’s refusal to share need not be
unreasonable in order for pursuit of these wrongs to remain within the ambit of
the criminal law’s business. Rather, these wrongs become and remain the criminal
law’s business simply insofar as criminal justice ofﬁcials are well-positioned to fulﬁl
the criminal law’s constitutive function.
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